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[Tjhe strength of free nations resides in the local community. Local
institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they
bring it within people's reach, they teach people how to use and en-
joy it. Without local institutions, a nation may establish a free gov-
ernment, but it cannot have the spirit of liberty. Transient passions,
momentary interests, or the changes of circumstances, may create the
external forms of independence; but the despotic tendency which has
been repressed into the interior of the social body, will, sooner or
later, appear on the surface!1
Looked at in this manner, strong and vibrant local communities are
essential to individual freedom because they make it possible to increase
involvement by individuals in societal decisions which regularly, signifi-
cantly, and often profoundly affect their lives.2 A city is thus not only a
* City Attorney, City of Berkeley 1985-present; President, City Attorney's Department,
League of California Cities 1993-1994; Member State Bar of California, Public Law Section,
Executive Committee; J.D. Hastings College of the Law, 1975.
1. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 74-76 (Francis Bowen ed. 1863), re-
printed in Gerald E. Frug, Local Government Law 4 (2d ed. 1994).
2.
The basic critique of the development of Western [S]ociety that has emerged since the
beginning of the nineteenth century has emphasized the limited ability of individuals to
control their own lives.... As the tradition of Aristotle to Rousseau emphasizes, indi-
vidual involvement in decisionmaking is impossible except on a small scale .... More
than a reduction in the size of decisionmaking units is necessary, however, before
popular participation in societal decision making can be realized. There must also be a
genuine transfer of power to the decentralized units. No one is likely to participate in
the decisionmaking of an entity of any size unless that participation will make a differ-
ence in his life.
Gerald E. Frug, The City AsA Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068-70 (1980) (foot-
notes omitted).
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relatively benign institution, as restraints on individual freedoms go, but, as
the institution most accessible to the average citizen, it is actually a vehicle
for constraining government excess.
Diametrically opposed to this comforting and even utopian notion of a
city as a community of individuals participating in the development and
pursuit of the collective good, is an historical suspicion of local govern-
ments based upon an equally unassailable proposition-that individual lib-
erties must be protected from being trampled upon by a local citizenry in-
flamed by passion and prejudice. Concerns about a tyrannical majority
imposing its will on an oppressed minority are, of course, objections to the
institution of democracy itself, not a flaw unique to local government.
Further, there is historical evidence that participation by individuals in the
institutions of a democracy is transformative, with individuals becoming
better informed about the practical consequences of particular decisions
and developing a genuine interest in promoting the welfare of the commu-
nity.4 Indeed, anyone who has been meaningfully involved in local gov-
ernment can attest to the educational and inspirational effect of assuming
the responsibilities of public office.
Nonetheless, fear of the potential abuses of bureaucratic power, har-
nessed to dangerous provincial concerns, often translates into an untested
assumltion that state government should curb irrational local govern-
ments. Largely ignored is the irony of perceiving a remote state govern-
ment, awash in campaign contributions from large and powerful interests,
as a protector of the individual and a guardian of democratic ideals. Each
of us can attest, however, to the increasingly familiar phenomena of a hith-
erto unknown figure who has been catapulted overnight onto the national
or state political stage by an army of handlers manipulating a blitz of tele-
vision advertising financed by enormous private wealth.6 And it is only at
the local government level that it is truly possible for the ordinary citizen
to become an elected official or for voters to feel they can accurately as-
sess a candidate's true strengths and weaknesses and influence their repre-
sentative's decisions.
These twin constructs of local government-the one highly desirable
and the other troubling-form the backdrop of many structural legal ques-
tions which have faced the courts over the years about the proper role and
responsibilities of local governments under the California Constitution.
3. "[An] objection to communal decisionmaking, an objection as old as Plato's, is that it
appeals to the worst instincts of individuals and leads to a despotism of ignorance and prejudice."
Id. at 1071.
4. See id.
5. See generally id. at 1118. This view was particularly prevalent during the era of local
party bosses running cities and widespread corruption.
6. Ross Perot's candidacy for President in 1992, and Al Checchi's 1998 candidacy for
Governor of California are illustrative in this regard.
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Further, such ambivalence toward government in general, and local gov-
ernment in particular, mirrors another ideological paradox in American
civic life. While most middle class Americans subscribe unequivocally to
individualism as a central and defining value in their lives, they simultane-
ously emphasize that it is important to their individual sense of well being
to contribute to their communities and participate in community life and
institutions. 7 Admittedly, the very term "community" has different mean-
ings and can be confused with a nostalgia for rural life, though there is
nothing inherent in the term itself that requires such a view. Whatever the
meaning, the complexity of late twentieth century society unfortunately
prevents individuals from engaing in self determination to the extent seen
in the communities of settlers. Somehow, nonetheless, individuals must
take part in shaping their institutions, if they are to implement their ex-
pected vision of simultaneous individual and community well-being. Such
commitment to both individualism and shared community values and re-
sponsibilities complicates the search for a coherent definition of the role
local government in American society as we approach the twenty-first
century.
In this essay, I argue that the development of the law regarding local
governments has been confused and contradictory, reflecting the societal
tensions between individualism and community responsibility and between
views of local governments as organs of self-determination on the one
hand and obstacles to personal freedom on the other. I conclude that the
California Constitution clearly rejects "Dillon's Rule" that a local govern-
ment is a mere creature of the California legislature with only those powers
specifically conferred upon it by the State. The constitution provides
rather, that within city borders, both general law cities9 and charter cities
have broad powers which are co-extensive with that of the state itself to
promote the public welfare.
DMlon's Rule and the California Constitution
Much of the academic literature regarding municipal governments has
been devoted to weighing the benefits and burdens of Dillon's Rule. The
rule provides that local government is a creature of the state and can exer-
cise only that power which the State has delegated to it, construed nar-
rowly. Any doubts are to be resolved against the exercise of power.1 The
7. See ROBERT N. BELCH Er AL, HABrrS OF THE HEART 144 (1985).
8. "The interdependence of modem society is particularly problematic for Americans. A
political tradition that enshrines individual liberty as its highest ideal leaves us ill prepared to
think about ways of managing the modem economy or developing broad social policies to meet
the needs of society as a whole-and, indeed the world as a whole." Id. at 113.
9. SeeCAL.CONST.art. 11,§§2,7.
10. SeeCAL CONsT. art. 11,§§2,5,7.
11. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 2, at 1109-20; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The
Structure ofLocal Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8-18 (1990).
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rule is named after John Dillon, a judge and writer of a municipal law
treatise who formulated the doctrine embodied in the rule. 12 The rule was
enunciated at a time when municipalities had incurred large debts to fi-
nance 3public improvements including railroads which subsequently
failed.' According to one legal commentator, "Dillon's Rule thereupon
became a weapon in the battle against fiscal overextension and its more vi-
cious counterpart, municipal corruption.""t The home rule movement re-
sulting in creation of charter cities was a reaction to the inherent facilities
of the view that local governments are inherently corrupt or foolish.'5
Many states, including California, have enacted constitutional provisions
which create a constitutional basis for the existence and power of cities,
and thus effectively abolish Dillon's Rule which postulates that cities exist
only by virtue of state legislative consent and limitation. In California, the
powers of the cities are set forth, in the main, in two constitutional provi-
sions: article 11, section 7, which describes the power of all cities, and ar-
ticle 11, section 5, which embodies the principle that cities created pursu-
ant to a charter have the ability to override general state laws with which
they conflict as to any subject which can be classified as a municipal af-
fair.'
6
In California, the most exhaustive discussion of city powers takes
place in the context of the powers of charter cities. Recent California
Supreme Court cases have given new life and vibrancy to the constitutional
powers of charter cities.18 However, general law cities continue to struggle
under Dillon's yoke.' 9 This essay first describes the California constitu-
tional provisions concerning cities.
Article 11, section 1 of the California Constitution provides that
counties (as opposed to cities) are legal subdivisions of the State. 20 Article
11, section 2 provides in pertinent part that the legislature shall prescribe
uniform procedures for city formation and city powers.2' Construing these
12. See Clayton P. Gillete, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, Or Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 959, 963 (1991).
13. See id. at 963-64.
14. Id.
15. See generally Sho Sato, "Municipal Affairs" In California, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1055
(1972).
16. CAL. CONST. art. 11, §§ 5, 7.
17. See Sato, supra note 15, at 1055.
18. See, e.g. Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992); California Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1991).
19. In light of the dearth of scholarly inquiry in California concerning the powers of general
law cities, the powers of charter cities is only briefly described in this essay since this essay's
focus is on the powers of all cities, including general law cities, under article 11, section 7, of the
California Constitution.
20. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
21. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
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two provisions, the California Supreme Court has held that a "county is a
governmental agency or political subdivision of the state government,
whereas a municipal corporation is an incorporation of the inhabitants of a
specified region for purposes of local government." 22 This principle has
never been expressly overruled by any court despite later language evoca-
tive of Dillon's Rule.
The key defining constitutional provision is article 11, section 7.23 It
provides in pertinent part as follows: "A county or city may make and en-
force within its limits all local police, sanitary and other ordinances and
regulations not in conflict with general laws." 24 This power is as broad as
that of the state itself; in the absence of a conflicting state law, local gov-
ernments, whether chartered or not, are not confined to regulating on
purely local matters.25 Moreover, the constitutional grant of power cannot
be denied by the state legislature merely by enacting a law which prohibits
the city from acting without any affirmative act of the legislature occupy-
ing the field.26 Such denial would violate the express authority granted by
the constitution to the municipality to enact local regulations. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated the principle thus: "In other words, an act by
the legislature in general terms that the local legislative body would have
no power to enact local, police, sanitary or other regulations, while in a
sense a general law, would have for its effective purose the nullification
of the constitutional grant, and, therefore, be invalid."27 Thus, while article
11, section 7 is referred to continually as the source of cities' "police"
power, its explicit terms contain no such limitations, and in fact authorize
the enactment of all police, sanitary or other ordinances and regulations.
Dillon Resurrected
Notwithstanding clear case law extending back to the adoption of ar-
ticle 11, section 7, holding that the power of a city, whether chartered or
general law, finds its origins in the California Constitution itself,28 there is
a line of authority beginning in 1966 which describes the powers of gen-
eral law cities in terms which appear to evoke Dillon's Rule. This aberra-
22. Abbot v. City of Los Angeles, 326 P.2d 484, 501 (Cal. 1958) (citations and internal
quotations omitted); accord City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Constr. Co., 424 P.2d 921, 928
(Cal. 1967).
23. CAL. CONsT. art. 11, § 7.
24. Id.
25. See Bishop v. City of San Jose, 460 P.2d 137, 141 (Cal. 1969); Carlin v. City of Palm
Springs, 92 Cal. Rptr. 535,539 (Ct. App. 1971).
26. See Exparte Daniels, 192 P.2d 442,445 (Cal. 1920).
27. Id. This language has never been overruled. In this case the Court found that the area of
traffic regulation was occupied by the state.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
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tion first emerges in the California Supreme Court decision of Irwin v. City
of Manhattan Beach.29 There the court describes municipal power thus:
A general law city has only those powers expressly conferred upon it
by the Legislature, together with such powers as are "necessarily in-
cident to those expressly granted or essential to the declared object
and purposes of the municipal corporation." The powers of such a
city are strictly construed, so that "any fair, reasonable doubt con-
cerning the exercise of a power is resolved against the corpora-
tion." o
This statement from Irwin is a virtual reiteration of Dillon's Rule,
seemingly abrogated by article 11, section 7 of the California Constitution.
It has been cited without question on numerous occasions, though neither
Irwin nor its progeny attempt to reconcile it with the plain terms of article
11, section 7 or with cases construing those terms.31 Even more interest-
ingly, the single case, Hurst v. City of Burlingame,32 relied upon in Irwin33
for the restatement of Dillon's Rule holds no such thing. In Hurst, the
California Supreme Court stated, "[Tihe city is limited in the exercise of
the powers by the constitution and general laws. It has only the powers
expressly conferred and such as are necessarily incident to those expressly
granted or essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipal
corporation." 4 In other words, although a city is granted only that power
which is expressly conferred on it, the source of that power is not the state
legislature, as Irwin stated, but is the constitution itself.
Of course, article 11, section 7 is not only a grant of power. It is also
a limitation on power because the exercise of the constitutional grant can-
not conflict with general or state law. Even so, there appears to be no con-
stitutional support for the proposition that general law cities need state
enabling authority in order to act. article 1, section 2 of the constitution
does clearly contemplate that the legislature must establish the manner in
which cities are created and the nature of their structure. But article 11,
section 7 confers broad powers on cities, including general law cities.
Thus, the assumption in Irwin and its progeny that general law cities re-
quire a grant of authority from the legislature appears to be at odds with
the constitution itself, a conflict the Irwin Court simply ignores. This con-
29. 415 P.2d 769 (Cal. 1966).
30. Id. at 773 (citation omitted).
31. See id.; see also Martin v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 513, 515 (Ct. App. 1991);
Cerini v. City of Cloverdale, 237 Cal. Rptr. 116, 119 (Ct. App. 1987); Wiltshire v. Superior
Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 199, 202 (Ct. App. 1985); Coffineau v. Eu, 137 Cal. Rptr. 199, 202 (Ct.
App. 1977); Norsco Enterprises v. City of Fremont, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659, 661-62 (Ct. App. 1976);
Snyder v. City of South Pasadena, 126 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (Ct. App. 1975); Widdows v. Koch,
69 Cal. Rptr. 464,471 (Ct. App. 1968).
32. 207 P. 308, 310 (Cal. 1929).
33. 415 P.2d at 773.
34. 207 P. at 310 (emphasis added).
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ceptual confusion is just as prevalent when it comes to the powers of gen-
eral law cities to raise revenues and to tax.
General Law Cities and the Taxation Power
In Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino,
35
the California Supreme Court stated, apparently for the first time, that lo-
cal governments' power to tax was a delegated power derived from the
state legislature under article 13, section 24. That section prohibits the
legislature from imposing taxes for local purposes but allows it to author-
ize local governments to impose taxes for such purposes.37 The court con-
strued the section's first paragraph as a limitation on the power of the state
legislature but then concluded that under its second paragraph the power to38
tax is delegated to local governments by the state legislature. The court
relied on four cases for this proposition.39 In the first, a city council acting
as a redevelopment agency was challenged by a flood control district and a
school district for illegally taking away their taxing power.40 There, the
court merely held that the two non-chartered agencies before the court de-
rived their taxing power from the state a.4  Of the remaining three cases re-
lied upon by the court in Guardino,42 two involved counties which are sub-
divisions of the state under California Constitution article 11, section 1, 4 3
and one involved a special hospital district, which of course has no sepa-
rate constitutional existence.44 All three involved legislation adopted to
implement article 13A of the California Constitution, with the local agen-
35. 11 Cal. 4th 220(1995).
36. See id. at 247-48.
37. See CAL CONST. art. 13, § 24. That section provides as follows:
The Legislature may not impose taxes for local purposes but may authorize the local
government to impose them.
Money appropriated from state funds to a local government for its local purposes may
be used as provided by law.
Money subvened to a local government under Section 25 may be used for State or local
purposes.
38. See 11Cal. 4th at 24748.
39. See id. at 248 (citing In re Development Plan for Bunker Hill, 389 P.2d 538 (Cal.
1964); County of Mariposa v. Merced Irr. Dist., 196 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1948); County of Los Ange-
les v. Sasaki, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103 (Ct. App. 1994); Martin Hosp. Dist. v. Rothman, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 828 (Ct. App. 1983)).
40. See Bunker Hill, 389 P.2d at 571.
41. "The nonchartered taxing agencies here involved, the flood control and school districts,
derive their taxing power from the general law and, subject to constitutional restrictions, the
Legislature has absolute power over the organization, dissolution, powers, and liability of such
corporations." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
42. 11 Cal. 4th at 248.
43. Mercedlrr. Dist., 196 P.2d at 924; Sasaki, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
44. Rothman, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
Winter 1998] CALn ORNIA AND DILLON
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
cies arguing that the constitution precluded the state legislature from taking
taxing power away from local agencies.
The issue of whether local government may be precluded by general
law from assessing a particular tax or taxing particular entities is an issue
of preemption under article 11, section 7 as to general law cities or under
article 11, section 5 as to charter cities.4 5 It does not go to the fundamental
question of whether the state legislature must explicitly authorize cities to
adopt taxes before they are permitted to do so, the proposition advanced by
Guardino.46 Indeed, the cases appear to state the contrary, as I next ex-
plain. They hold that the power to tax is an inherent dimension of local
governance, a principle which appears to make far better conceptual sense.
And even though these holdings concerned cities' inherent power to tax in
the context of charter cities, their basis lay not in the fact that the cities
were chartered but in the fact that the cities were municipal corporations.
In Ainsworth v. Bryant,47 the California Supreme Court quoted the
United States Supreme Court, stating:
A Municipality without the power of taxation would be a body with-
out life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose ....
When such a corporation is created, the power of taxation is vested
in it, as an essential attribute, for all the purposes of its existence,
unless its exercise be in express. terms prohibited. For the accom-
plishment of these purposes, its authorities, however limited the cor-
poration, must have power to raise money and control its expendi-
ture.
4 8
This principle has never been expressly overruled by the California
Supreme Court and was reiterated in exactly these terms in a later Califor-
nia Supreme Court case.49 It was also enunciated in Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society v. County of Los Angeles,50 where the court stated: "[T]he
power of taxation for revenue purposes is probably the most vital and es-
sential attribute of the government. Without such power it cannot func-
tion."51
It is difficult to imagine a proposition which is more self-evident. The
power granted by article 11, section 7 to pass all police, sanitary and other
laws and ordinances not in conflict with general law would be rendered
meaningless if the city authorized to pass such laws was not even able to
raise money to support its very existence. Zoning laws, for example,
would be useless if the zoning ordinance could not impose fees or other
45. CAL. CONST. art. 11, §§ 5,7.
46. 11 Cal. 4th at 247-48.
47. 211 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1949).
48. Id. at 566 (quoting United States v. Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 (1878)).
49. See City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 308 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957).
50. 182 P.2d 178 (Cal. 1947).




exactions including, for instance, property tax assessments to finance im-
provements in new subdivisions. Indeed, there is no area of regulation for
which it would be possible to imagine a regulatory body without the power
to impose its own revenue raising exactions. If the constitutional power to
tax was in fact one which must be expressly delegated by the state legisla-
ture, then the legislature could prevent a city from exercising its constitu-
tional grant of police power simply by denying it all power to tax and thus
to support its operations. A city's police power would be meaningless if it
could be defeated by such an obvious stratagem. Moreover, such a result
would vitiate the principle, recognized even in Irwin,2 that a city has those
powers which are "necessarily incident to those expressly granted or es-
sential to the declared object and purposes of the municipal corporation. ' 3
Accordingly, it would seem that under the reasoning of these prior Califor-
nia Supreme Court cases, all cities, and thus presumably even general law
cities have the inherent power to tax under the California Constitution,
notwithstanding the language of Guardino,54 since it failed to distinguish
or expressly overrule this aspect of these prior California Supreme Court
cases. Thus, with respect to the power of general law cities to impose
taxes, the case law is also contradictory.
Charter Cities
Charter cities are governed by article 11, section 5 of the California
Constitution, providing that a city's charter may allow it to make and en-
force all ordinances and regulations with respect to "municipal affairs,"
subject to its charter's restrictions, and with respect to other matters sub-
ject to general laws.55 This section also provides that with respect to "mu-
nicipal affairs," a charter city's laws shall supersede all inconsistent gen-56
eral laws. Thus, although charter cities have a superior ability to trump,
as it were, conflicting state laws, nothing in the language of article 11, sec-
tion 5 suggests that charter cities have more inherent power in general.
The source of most power for all cities, whether chartered or not, is Article
11, Section 7. The notion that general law cities but not charter cities are
mere creatures of the state with limited delegated powers-a notion which
periodically resurfaces in the cases-appears to be a curious anomaly with
no actual support in the California Constitution.
52. Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, 415 P.2d 769 (Cal. 1966).
53. Id. at 773.
54. Id. at 773-75.
55. CAL CONST. art. 11, § 5.
56. See id. A detailed history of the adoption of this "home rule" provision of the California
Constitution is found in Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 992-95 (Cal. 1992). The case also
describes the municipal affairs doctrine and how modem cases have analyzed claimed conflicts
between general laws and claimed municipal affairs. See id. The preemption analysis under arti-
cle 11, section 5 is addressed in another paper at this symposium and is beyond the scope of this
paper on the nature of cities, and thus is not addressed further here.
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Conclusion
There is ample support in the explicit language of the California Con-
stitution and the cases interpreting it that all cities, including general law
cities, are not subdivisions or creatures of the state but derive their power
directly from the California Constitution. This power is as broad as that of
the state itself within a city's borders absent affirmative preemptive state
legislation and includes the power to raise revenues and to tax. The case
law in this area, however, is contradictory and confusing. It is therefore
essential that general law cities, when submitting future appellate briefs,
seek to lend conceptual structure and coherence to the body of law which
governs them, thereby reclaiming powers which have been unwittingly
eroded in the current analytical confusion.
